Madagascar agrees to a 10 year fisheries agreement with Chinese consortium

At the beginning of September, Hery Rajaonarimampianina, the president of Madagascar, attended the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. It was announced during this visit that the two countries had finalised a 10 year investment agreement, entered into between the Malagasy Agency for Economic Development and Promotion of Enterprises, and the Chinese business consortium, Taihe Century Investments Developments Corporation. It is an agreement that has been presented as part of Madagascar’s blue economy initiative.

Published details of the investment agreement remain limited. According to sources in Madagascar, the President had negotiated the deal with almost no input from administration, parliament or civil society, and the country’s main development partners, including the World Bank and the EU were not aware of the deal either. Yet what we know so far suggests the investment agreement could be disastrous for the country, particularly for the artisanal fisheries sector.

A sustainable blue economy?

According to a press release, the 10 year agreement comes with a promise of investment by the Taihe corporation of up to 2.7 billion USD. It is not clear precisely how this money will be used, although it is described that the funds will go towards building fisheries infrastructure, support for fisheries management and the fight against IUU fishing. Part of the investment will also go towards a bamboo forestation project. In return, the Chinese consortium will be allowed to deploy up to 330 vessels in coastal fisheries. The press release makes a bold claim that the agreement will see 10,000 new jobs created.

A representative of the artisanal fishing sector emphasized that "the state is robbing coastal fishermen of their livelihood". Not only he is concerned about the number of boats to come, but he also points out that the 3,600 jobs promised in the short term represent only 3% of the number of artisanal fishermen who live on these fisheries resources and who are already having great difficulty in making ends meet. "Bringing several hundred ships would mean the disappearance of the 100,000 small scale Malagasy fishermen and their families! This will create unemployment, insecurity and increased risk of conflict between communities. Depending on the type of boats that come, there is a fear of fish habitat degradation and overexploitation. Indeed, we only have one or two operational coast guard boats ". He also fears that this agreement will benefit only a handful of people, with corruption jeopardizing the future of entire fishing communities.

The signing of this agreement comes also as the country moves near to the Presidential elections—starting in November. The deal may be a bid to show the country that the President, who is standing for re-election, is bringing in much needed foreign investment—Madagascar remains one of the poorest countries in the world.

Yet news of the agreement has already caused protest among fishing communities. Most fish stocks have been heavily exploited for years, including valuable crustaceans and demersal fishes, not only caught by local small-scale fishers, but also also targeted by foreign owned semi-industrial and industrial trawlers. Indeed, according to a review of fisheries undertaken by Smartfish in 2014, almost all commercial fisheries have been fully exploited, or are being overfished. Conflict between local artisanal fisheries—thought to number over 100,000, and foreign owned trawlers (and commercial prawn farms) has been reported for many years.

Whether Chinese firms will actually bring the full quota of new boats to the country remains uncertain, and no one is sure what type of vessels will be involved and what type of species will be targeted. Nevertheless, a framework agreement that permits 330 vessels represents an enormous addition to the overall fishing capacity in the fisheries sector.

It is also unlikely that the 2.7 billion USD will materialise in full. Similar commitments were made when Mauritania agreed to a 100 million USD investment by Chinese state corporation, Poly Hon Don in 2011. This again was negotiated by the President without consultation, and the investment agreement only became public when it was leaked in the press. While the company has brought its full quota of 100 vessels to Mauritania, evidence that this deal has created new jobs for locals or massive investment for local fisheries is lacking. Indeed, information on the activities of the Chinese company remains closely guarded by the Mauritanian authorities, who have also consented to special rules for the company to export fish without the usual government oversight. It is an example that those protesting the new deal in Madagascar should consider carefully.

Implications for development partners and the EU

For development partners, who have provided Madagascar with millions over the years to improve fisheries management, the announcement must be considered deeply worrying. Similar events have happened in other countries. In addition to Mauritania, a few years ago the President of Mozambique concluded a secret billion dollar investment in the tuna fishing sector, leading to its development partners temporarily suspending aid to the country.

For the EU, the situation in Madagascar is highly sensitive. Development aid and trade deals were suspended in 2009 due to the unconstitutional removal of the democratically elected President by the ruling party. Sanctions were lifted in 2014 and the EU has subsequently committed over 500 million Euros to the country to 2020, as well as funding fisheries development programmes including Smartfish.

At the same time, the European Commission is beginning negotiations for a renewal of its sustainable fisheries partnership agreement with Madagascar. The previous protocol agreement, covering the period of 2014 to 2018, was worth over 6 million Euros, with nearly half of this money being directed to improving fisheries management. Yet the finalisation of a new protocol will have to be based on full transparency by the Malagasy government, including on its existing fisheries agreements with other foreign countries and companies.

It is therefore paramount that the government of Madagascar responds to calls for publishing all details of this new investment agreement, and that there is the opportunity for this agreement to be given full scrutiny by parliament, civil society and development partners, before it is allowed to progress further. Without this commitment, the notion that the country’s leaders support a sustainable ‘blue economy’ must be considered dubious.

The International Fight Against IUU fishing: Moving from criminal to social justice?

To mark the first International day for the fight against IUU fishing, CFFA's brief paper looks critically at the concept of IUU fishing and the policy ideas on how best to fight it. We argue that popular images of IUU fishing are misleading and fail to reflect the nature of the most serious  threats to coastal communities. A key aspect lies with the corrupt relationships between governments, political elites and businesses exploiting marine and coastal resources. Because of this, we argue that relying on 'criminal justice' as a solution is insufficient for coastal communities and small-scale fishers. 

Blue Bond…Saving your fish or bankrupting the oceans?

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To save the oceans and reform unsustainable fisheries, we need the help of private investors - and on a huge scale. This is an idea that many international conservation organisations and investment banks have been promoting for years, including the likes of Credit Suisse, who now hosts an annual conference on ‘conservation finance’ from its New York offices.  

Many reports have been written on the business case for private capital markets to finance ocean conservation and fisheries reforms. The arguments are very simple: governments don’t have the resources to fund conservation, and the traditional sources of extra finance (coming from donors and philanthropists) are completely inadequate. Conservation and fisheries reform should therefore be more open to private investors - who have a great deal of money. Investing in conservation and fisheries reforms is lucrative - sustainable fisheries will increase the wealth potential from the seas, and therefore can give investors a good return on their money.

There are many proposals on how to attract millions of dollars for marine conservation from private investors. One of them is for governments and companies to issue blue bonds. This is in fact a well established strategy - the World Bank and the European Investment Bank started issuing ‘green bonds’ in 2007/8. These raise money from private financial markets which is then ring-fenced for specific green projects and activities. The green bond market has done exceptionally well - last year, governments, multilateral development banks and companies raised 130 billion USD through green bonds - nearly twice as much as they did in 2016. 

This year, the concept of a “blue bond” has finally become reality. The Seychelles has announced its intention to issue the world’s first blue bond, with the help of the World Bank and the UN’s Global Environment Facility. It is likely that the Seychelles blue bond will be quite small - 15 to 20 million USD. But the importance is that Seychelles is being used as ‘proof of concept’. The hope is that other developing and small-island coastal states will follow its example. Indeed, last year Fiji issued the first national green bond for a small-island developing state, and Nigeria also issued its first green bond. NatureVest - a US based organisation set up by JP Morgan and The Nature Conservation to specialise in leveraging private capital for conservation - thinks that in 10 years they will be selling a billion USD of blue bonds. 

The dangers of the blue bond market? 

 Raising funds through international capital markets could end up delivering the promised “triple win outcomes”: good for the environment, good for poorer communities, and good for the investors. But is this model safe to replicate?

So many organisations are supporting conservation finance in general, and the concept of green or blue bonds specifically. There are many reports describing how these are vital if we are to save the planet. Yet hardly any of these consider what might go wrong. In CFFA’s publication on blue bonds, we set out the reasons why the blue bond market are not attractive for small-scale fishers, and why the claims made about blue bonds are dubious.

Credit Suisse and the first tuna bond

The report includes a case study from Mozambique. Mozambique raised 850 million USD to finance the launch of its national tuna fishing company, dubbed by others as the world’s first ‘tuna bonds’. At first glance, this has nothing to do with blue bonds. However, just like a blue bond, the issuer claimed the money would be spent on sustainable fishing and the funds will have an enormously positive outcome on the national economy. The bond was financed and arranged by Credit Suisse, in collaboration with other European and Russian banks, some of whom also support conservation finance and green bonds. In fact, in 2013 - when Credit Suisse was finalising the arrangement for Mozambique’s tuna bonds, the bank was working with WWF and other conservation organisations on initiatives such as 50in10 and the Global Ocean Partnership. It is a bank that was - and still is - at the forefront of a global campaign to raise ethical financing to save the ocean. 

The tuna bonds did bankrupt Mozambique. They also provided millions of dollars in fees for Credit Suisse and other banks, accounting firms and lawyers. The tuna bonds were issued in secrecy and have led to a range of concerns about high level corruption and conflicts of interest. The prospectus for the bonds - sent out to investors but kept confidential - was deceitful and it massively overvalued the business proposal. Mozambique’s tuna fishing company and the expensive fishing vessels it bought from France, do not generate enough income to pay off the investors or pay its workers. Mozambique has defaulted on its repayments, and is struggling to get a bailout from the IMF. Remarkably, the case of Mozambique does not seem to be discussed at Credit Suisse’s annual conferences in New York, when the network of bankers and conservation organisations come together to plan how to promote blue bonds and other innovative financial instruments. 

Mozambique is an extreme example of the risks of ‘sovereign bonds’ - whereby governments raise money through international capital markets. But Mozambique is not the only example. In the last decade, more and more African governments have decided to raise cash through the bond markets. Before 2006, only South Africa had done so. But by last year, African governments accounted for 40 billion USD in bond debts; meaning bonds have become almost as important for African governments as development aid. The Seychelles, Ghana, the Democratic of Congo and Mozambique have been the first countries to default on these debts, but there is a growing concern that others will follow. 

So why should we be concerned about a growth in the blue bond market? Our report raises the following issues: 

Countries can easily raise too much cash through bonds - leading to unsustainable debt. 

This is a risk made more likely where valuations on potential returns lack credibility. This is an aspect that characterises fisheries - there are now many reports that claim the wealth from the oceans is massively under appreciated, and if developing countries could impose better management and deal with illegal fishing (and sell blue carbon credits) - then governments could make millions of dollars in extra taxes and levies. The trouble, however, is that these projections on the enormous wealth potential of the oceans have often been based on dodgy statistics, and they rely on a fantasy, whereby African governments can easily develop their ‘blue economy’ into a sustainable cash cow that will then fund pro-poor and environmentally friendly development. 

As it is, exaggerated and simplistic reports on the wealth potential of the oceans could easily be used in the prospectus sent to investors, who end up believing that the government is in a good position to earn enough money to pay back the debts, when they are clearly not. 

In fact, deciding how much money to raise in bonds is not always based on the likely economic returns for the bond issuer. In Mozambique, Credit Suisse originally raised 500 million USD for the tuna company. But they found there was a strong demand among investors, so a further 350 million USD was issued. The case is much worse than that - Credit Suisse ended up issuing 2 billion USD in bonds for Mozambique, which included raising cash for two other companies that were set up to provide monitoring and control of the country’s EEZ. There was no information made available to investors that might convince them 2 billion USD was not a viable investment, although because the government of Mozambique had guaranteed the loans, investors were probably not too worried. 

Overvaluing bonds means the country may default on repayments, which means it is forced into debt restructuring (as is the case in Ghana and Mozambique), which tends to harm service delivery for the poor. Alternatively - and possibly more likely for ethical bonds - the government relies on other income streams to make up the shortfall. In Africa, by far the largest source of foreign cash available to governments is from the export of primary commodities, such as from oil, gas and mining, or fish. Blue bonds - as with green bonds - may not be very sustainable debt, meaning there is pressure to promote other polluting industries to compensate.  

This risk of bonds may seem similar to other forms of government borrowing, such as concessional loans from development banks. However, bonds are far more expensive for developing countries - they have much higher interest rate payments, and also much higher fees for the bank managers. Unfortunately, the drive to encourage developing countries to raise more money on private capital markets, which is a policy promoted by so many aid agencies often under the guise of ‘blending private and public finances’, may be causing a reduction in concessional loans and aid grants. 

Bonds are at risk of corruption and fraud

The ease in which governments can raise too much money from bonds makes them vulnerable to corruption. This is also facilitated by the lack of transparency that seems to be a characteristic of bonds. Again, Mozambique is possibly the stand out example, but there have been others. Tanzania raised 600 million USD in 2013 from issuing a sovereign bond. Yet investigations found that the lead bank manager - Standard Bank - colluded with Tanzanian authorities to increase the bank fees for the bond, which was then used as money to pay a kick back for being awarded the deal. 

National bonds are not normally used to fund a specific project, but are rather sums of money that are distributed to a range of projects based on an eligibility criteria. There is a great deal of discretion in how the proceeds are used. Conflicts of interests and kick-backs are therefore inherent risks. In theory, ethical bonds may come with higher standards for accountability and transparency than other types of bonds. Indeed, voluntary standards on green bonds focus on ensuring that there is reporting on how the bonds were used. But generally bond issuers are expected to self-report, and there is no requirement for external auditing. 

The possibility that bank managers and governments abuse blue bonds for personal gain should be considered a risk in the emerging blue bond market. The fact that Credit Suisse and other European banks have been caught up in corruption related to bonds is further proof. Yet this is not mentioned in any of the promotional material for conservation finance. This contrasts to funds provided by donors and multilateral banks, for they have made attempts to introduce anti-corruption guidelines and safeguards. Private financial markets are much more relaxed on this. 

The same is true on human rights. Donors and multilateral banks generally have grievance mechanisms and social and environmental safeguard mechanisms. They may not work very well in all cases, but there is no such framework in place for bonds, ethical or not. 

Aligning marine conservation to ‘profit maximisation’ 

It is an explicit objective of conservation finance is to make sure that investments in conservation are profitable. For blue bonds, choices on how money will be used are therefore likely to be influenced by profit maximisation. This is worrying for groups who depend on the ocean but don’t generate a lot of money, such as subsistence and small-scale fishers. Generally the promotional material for conservation finance tells us that the benefits of these investments will be shared well, and that they will have a pro-poor impact. That seems unlikely.

A fundamental problem with relying on private capital markets to fund conservation is that the only measure of success is money. Non-monetary values do not translate well into financial instruments. The policy of encouraging governments in developing countries to raise funds through private capital markets has been strongly criticised for encouraging the privatisation of public goods and promoting the interests of multinational firms, and at the expense of local economies and businesses. 

The spectre of blue washing

One of the main criticism of ‘green bonds’ is that they are not always very green. We don’t know yet what the concept of blue in blue bonds is, but we should assume it includes environmental sustainability. 

Governments or companies can call their bond whatever they like. However, voluntary standards and labelling schemes have been integral to the growth of the green bond market. The standards are vague, and encourage bond issuers to pay for a third party assessment that demonstrates the ‘greenness’ of the proposal. The actual definition of ‘green’ is left open to interpretation. 

Four international companies have cornered the market in providing these assessments. This is a weak system - companies providing assessments and labels have a vested interest in providing favourable assessments - as this will lead to more business and a better market standing.  One of the key dilemmas facing these assessments is flagging the ‘rebound effect’. A simple example is a scheme to reduce the energy consumption of transport, which leads to savings. However, cheaper transport means people travel more, meaning the net impact of the investment was unsuccessful in reducing energy consumption and the release of carbon.  These rebound effects of green financed projects are thought to be common, but it can take time to measure and detect. Third party assessments of green bonds often raise these issues, but it is not considered sufficient to give a bond a negative assessment. We therefore have green bonds passed as green by third party assessors for oil companies.

A further weakness of the green bond market is that the focus is on the use of proceeds. A key risk is that governments issue green bonds, but continue to invest and promote other polluting industries. Assessments of green bonds do not consider ‘policy coherence’, meaning a country such as Nigeria can raise a green bond while continuing to be heavily dependent on the export of fossil fuels. 

The same problem manifests with investors and banks. Institutions like Credit Suisse or JP Morgan  are enthusiastically promoting green bonds, but have much larger investments in dirty bonds. The same has been true for the World Bank Group, who has promoted the green bond market while generating more funds for the establishment of new coal plants. 

Unlike other types of financing, green bonds also lack discipline. That is, money is provided upfront for green investments, but there is no way to return money if the impact of the investment was disappointing, even if there was interest in undertaking end of project assessments, which does not appear as a feature of green bonds at all. 

A dilemma: dealing with the risks of the blue bond market

Organisations worried about these risks presented by conservation finance and the growth of blue bonds are confronted with a dilemma. A pragmatic approach could be to focus on mitigating the risks, including campaigning for stronger voluntary guidelines, commitments from banks to be transparent, and for social and environmental safeguards to be put in place by governments and financial institutes. Civil society organisations may also decide to invest time and resources in monitoring blue bonds and undertaking their own independent assessments. 

But mitigating risks will be time consuming and may be unsuccessful. Indeed, the logic behind conservation capital is dubious. The underlying argument put forward that private financial markets will save the planet is unconvincing. 

The ‘financing gap’ is ideological. The inability of governments to ensure marine ecosystems are used in a sustainable way is not simply down to a lack of resources and money; the root causes in most places is political in nature. We should not imagine that somehow governments will become responsible stewards of marine ecosystems simply by ensuring they have access to more funds through debt instruments. Indeed, given what we know about international debt markets in Africa, relying on these further will most likely lead to a growing funding gap for African governments.  

Estimates of the financing gap for conservation are also a fabrication. There are many different ways in which changes could be achieved to support sustainable fishing and marine conservation, such as prioritising sustainable small-scale fisheries over other commercial industrial fishing companies. If funding is an issue, then other more sustainable sources of funds should be encouraged, such, raising taxes on polluting industries, or reducing government spending on other areas, such as the military.  But there is no reason to believe that the only source of financing left for the ocean comes from private capital markets. There is also good reason to believe that following this path will provide disproportionate benefits for wealthier sections of society. 

Ultimately conservation finance requires blind faith in the fairy tale that the only way we can achieve sustainable marine ecosystems is by making vast amounts of profits in the process, for ever. The move towards sustainable use of marine ecosystems will also require difficult choices to reduce growth and limit consumption. Sadly, there is a distinct possibility that the push for increased private financing is being made by a coalition of organisations that all have vested interests; investors seeking to display their social and environmental credentials, NGOs looking to increase their own funding, banks that charge lucrative fees, and governments looking for additional short-term cash. 

The FiTI Awakens....

On 27th April 2017, the Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI) was officially launched in Bali. It was the result of two years of consultations, led by an international advisory group, composed of senior government officials, representatives from both large scale and small-scale fisheries, international organisations, including the World Bank, the African Bank for Development, as well as leading fisheries NGOs. The key outcome of the launch was the ‘FiTI Standard’ that sets out how the FiTI works and what information will need to be made available by implementing countries. 

At the time of the launch, at least four countries are committed to implementing the FiTI: Mauritania, the Seychelles, Indonesia and The Republic of Guinea. Governments of several other countries have also indicated an interest. The International Board of the FiTi includes people working in governments from the four implementing countries as well as Sweden, representation from international NGOs (Greenpeace, Bread for the World, Oceana, WWF). Industry representatives on the FiTI International Board have been harder to find, and so far there is only one commitment from the industrial sector, that of the Russian fishing fleet. However, what is positive is that half of the seats available for industry representatives will be reserved for the small-scale sector, and CAOPA are now confirmed as being part of the FiTI governing board, as is a representative from Traditional Fisherfolk Union of Indonesia. 

Development of the FiTI Standard

That the FiTI has got this far demonstrates widespread agreement that lack of transparency has been a problem in fisheries. This has been a key point for advocacy by many NGOs working on fisheries reforms, as well as a long standing issue raised by small-scale fishing communities. Although there has been disagreement on how far transparency should go (and what constitutes commercially sensitive information), intergovernmental organisations, such as the European Commission, as well as representatives of the industrial fisheries sector are also beginning to come out in support. 

At the outset the FiTI was focused on improving transparency on who has a right to fish, what is paid for that right and what is caught. However, this was considered too narrow, and a large part of the work by the international advisory group was to re-think what type of information the FiTI should include and why. As a result of this process the FiTI Standard now includes 12 reporting elements. These are thematic areas on which countries are requested to publish information. The 12 requirements are: 

1. The establishment of a public registry of national fisheries laws, regulations and official policy documents.

2. The publication of a summary of laws and decrees on fisheries tenure arrangements.

3. The disclosure of all foreign fishing access agreements, as well as related studies on the environmental, social and economic impacts of these agreements. 

4. The publication of national reports on the state of fish stocks.

5. The publication of an up-to-date online registry of authorised large-scale vessels, as well as information on their payments and recorded catches (aggregated for each flag state) and studies on social, economic and environmental impacts. 

6. The publication of information on the small-scale sector, including the numbers of fishers, their catches and financial transfers to the state and any studies on the social and economic impacts of this sector 

7. The publication of information on the post-harvest sector and fish trade.

8. The publication of information on law enforcement efforts, including a description of efforts to ensure compliance by fishers and a record of offences and protections in the sector.

9. The publication of information on labour standards in the fisheries sector and efforts to enforce these. 

10. Disclosure of information on government transfers and fisheries subsidies.

11. The publication of information on official development assistance regarding public sector projects related to fisheries and marine conservation.

12. Information on the country’s status regarding beneficial ownership transparency.

At the outset it was envisaged that implementing the FiTI would involve the production of a comprehensive national report with all the information and data required to satisfy these reporting elements. Some thematic areas would be reported on each year, others every two years. Towards the end of the conceptual phase of the FiTI, it was realised the idea of countries having to produce substantial reports each year was unattractive. Not only was this considered costly, but most importantly it could undermine other efforts to compile and publish data on the fisheries sector. Now the emphasis is for governments to publish information on their own websites, not through a FiTI report. The role of the FiTi will be primarily one of verifying this public information. The ambition of the FiTI therefore is to see public authorities improve their own approach to providing credible information, rather than producing lengthy independent technical reports.

One of the early criticisms of the FiTi was that it puts a disproportionate burden on developing countries, because many have limited capacity to collect and publish information. There was a concern that this would make the FiTI unfeasible for poorer countries, including those with substantial small-scale fisheries. The FiTI Standard therefore emphasises the idea of ‘progressive improvement’. Countries are expected to publish, in an accessible way, what information they do have. In the event that they do not have certain information requested under the FiTi Standard, they are under an obligation to develop plans and timeframes to collect and publish this information. A failure to have any of the information required by the FiTI does not exclude countries from obtaining a ‘compliant status’, as long as they are being honest about the lack of their data and agree on a timeframe and plan to improve the situation. 

How the FiTI attempts to improve fisheries information at the national level. 

Transparency is widely regarded as a necessary component of responsible fisheries management, and there are three main ways in which the FiTI could make a positive impact. 

Firstly, the FiTI strives to reveal data that has otherwise been obscured from public scrutiny. This is perhaps what most people think of in terms of a transparency initiative. For example, in many countries information on authorised fishing vessels, access agreements and aggregated catches has been considered confidential, or at least authorities have not considered it necessary to make this information public. 

Secondly, the FiTI attempts to verify if information in the public domain is reliable and complete. The FiTI requires an external assessment of information by an independent consultant, as well as further verification of the findings by a national multi-stakeholder group, composed by CSOs, industry and government representatives. As such, the FiTI is not simply aimed at lifting the lid on confidentiality, but also at providing improved credibility of data held by public authorities. 

Thirdly, the FiTI is designed to reveal where public authorities simply do not collate information and it requires the national multi-stakeholder group to come to an agreement on how these gaps in knowledge will be addressed. As such, the FiTI provides the opportunity for countries to take stock of existing knowledge on the fisheries sector, and develop national plans for improvements.

These three aspects to the FiTI need to be given equal recognition. In some countries the most important contribution of the FiTI will be to highlight where data already in the public domain contains errors, and in other cases the contribution will lie in exposing and addressing the limited approaches to gathering data for publication.  

How information from the FiTi supports international fisheries governance reform efforts

The FiTi has a narrow objective of increasing the availability and credibility of fisheries information. It does not attempt to engage in any further advocacy, such as commenting on the effectiveness of fisheries management or the sustainability of fishing. Nevertheless, the FiTI has been developed so that it supports several other international fisheries governance reform efforts. This includes, for example: 

1. By requiring national authorities to publish the most recent studies on status of fish stocks, as well as information on catches and discards, the FiTI aims to contribute to national debates on the adequacy of policies and practices to achieve sustainable fishing. 
2. The FiTI obliges implementing countries to publish information on fisheries access agreements, including disclosing any studies on the social, economic and environmental impacts of these agreements. Such step has already been taken by the EU, and is increasingly required by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, but has been resisted by most of the other main fishing nations and coastal countries involved in fishing access agreements. For the EU, the FiTI will contribute to establishing a ‘level playing field’, while more importantly it could lead to increased national debates on the foreign fishing agreements and their wider impacts, including on small-scale fisheries and food security. 
3. The FiTI supports international efforts to address illegal fishing and unsustainable levels of legal fishing. It requires countries to disclose detailed lists of licensed vessels, as well as information on prosecutions and resources used for law enforcement. It is widely recognised that lack of transparency has facilitated frauds and corruption in the fisheries sector. This list of licensed vessels will also further contribute to the FAO’s efforts to establish a global record of fishing vessels.  
4. The FiTI requests information on tenure arrangements to be published, including a description of how national authorities are ensuring informal fishing rights are codified and protected. In this way the FiTI supports the implementation of the International Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure. 
5. The FiTI requires governments to collate and publish various information on the small-scale fishing sector, including information on their social, economic and food security contributions. If this information is not available, then countries have to agree on a time frame for this information to be collated and publicised. The FiTI therefore supports the implementation of the FAO’s Guidelines on Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication . 
6. The FiTI requests implementing countries to disclose information on national efforts to collate information on the Beneficial ownership of fishing vessels. In the short term it will not mean countries will produce complete lists of beneficial owners, but it is intended to galvanise international awareness and support for beneficial ownership transparency. 
7. The inclusion of information on labour standards in the fisheries sector supports international efforts to abolish slavery and human trafficking , and can be used to further advocate for the promotion of the ILO Work in Fishing Convention ratification. 
8. The request to publish information on government transfers to the fisheries sector supports international efforts, including through the WTO, to increase awareness of the scale and impact of fisheries subsidies, and is intended to stimulate national debates on the contribution of capacity enhancing subsidies to unsustainable fishing, as well as the distribution of subsidies among different fisheries sectors, such as between large scale and small-scale fisheries. 
9. The request to collate and publish information on development projects in the fisheries sector supports international efforts to increase aid effectiveness, and compliments the International Aid Transparency Initiative. 

Will FiTI have a lasting impact on fisheries governance?

The core assumption of the FiTI is that increasing public access to information will enhance active participation in national debates on fisheries reforms, and raise the prospect of accountability by public authorities. 

A key issue is whether there is the capacity and interest, at the national level, to undertake further analysis of the information produced. The FiTI could succeed in raising public information, but the lack of interest or capacity to do anything with this information will not lead to positive changes in fisheries governance. This needs to be assessed as FiTI is implemented in different countries. The risk may be overstated, as the demand for increased transparency has been prevalent for many years, including among environmental organisations and groups working on the rights of small-scale fisheries. Nevertheless, to increase the its will require support to local groups and researchers, including journalists, to do more with data being provided by governments participating in the FiTI. 

Ultimately, however, the success of the FiTI helping to achieve lasting governance reforms rests on the assumption that transparency can lead to accountability. If new information supports policy recommendations or reveals instances of abuse of powers, corruption or frauds, none of this will lead to change if public authorities or the private sector face little pressure from their citizens and from the international community to reform. 

In these cases, the risk for the FiTI is that is will offer governments and companies a façade of respectability, while allowing for a continuation of business as normal. This threat is particularly prevalent in countries characterised by authoritarian governments, limited means of participation in decision making processes and low levels of individual and media freedoms. 

It is therefore crucial that those engaged in the FiTI, including at the international level, promote further efforts to understand and confront forms of oppression, authoritarianism, lack of individual and media freedoms that undermine good governance of fisheries.

Two other issues will also affect whether the FiTI has lasting impacts on fisheries governance. 

Approaching access to information as a right

The FiTI Standard makes no attempt to encourage national authorities to legislate for access to information. Indeed, a criticism of other existing transparency initiatives is they treat freedom of information and participation as a voluntary gesture, rather than as a right. It would be far better if countries established laws guaranteeing citizens the right to access information and the right for participation in decision making. In the long term, this may be viewed as a stronger approach, otherwise the gains made by FiTI may be short lived, dependent on the good will of authorities and foreign fishing partners. 

This limitation to the FiTI remains important, and arguably it should do more to promote access to information as a right. The European Union’s Aarhus Convention provides one of the strongest examples, and forms the basis for the UN’s Bali Guidelines on establishing laws and institutions on access to information, participation and access to justice. It was perhaps a missed opportunity not to link the Bali Guidelines to the launch of FiTI, which took place in the same city. Ultimately the goal of the FiTI should be to ensure implementing countries adopt similar legislation to the Aarhus Convention, otherwise their commitment to transparency may be precarious and open to doubt. 

Trading on ‘compliant’ status

A further issue with the FiTI lies with the implications of labelling countries as ‘compliant’ with the Standard. To some, this may be seen as an attractive dimension to the FiTI. As more countries sign up, others will be forced to follow suit, with the end result being a gradual improvement to transparency across more and more countries. A similar logic is used for other international voluntary initiatives, such as eco-labelling. Those fisheries that can demonstrate environmental credentials via voluntary certification schemes, are rewarded by more secure market access, meaning those that do not are forced to engage with these voluntary eco-labelling efforts if they wish to maintain their market access share or increase it. 

The worry for those countries that decide not to engage with the FiTI is that this decision may be viewed negatively by others, and it could influence decisions on access to foreign donor funding, or even the negotiation of trade agreements. There may be genuine reasons why a country does not want to be part of the FiTI, such as lack of resources or simply that the country feels it s doing wellto improve civic engagement without the need of an international initiative. Indeed, at the launch of the FiTi Standard in Bali, the head of the Fisheries Forum Agency from the Pacific expressed doubt about the demand for the FiTI among its member states. 

Moreover, achieving compliant status for the FiTI does not mean a country is more transparent than another who is not part of the initiative, in the same way obtaining an eco-label does not mean a fishery is better managed than one without. This is particularly true of the FiTI, as the decision to emphasise ‘progressive improvement’ means a country can, for a time, be compliant without publishing much information. Perhaps less information than another country that is not involved in the FiTI. 

The dilemma here is that transparency is important, and there must be international pressure on countries to reform. Lack of transparency in the fisheries is a well recognized and widespread problem andprogress to improve this has been very slow in many countries. Public fisheries access agreements should not be entered in to with countries that manage fisheries in a highly opaque way, and it would be justified to favour investments in countries where fisheries is managed more openly. The FiTI provides a mechanism to help countries improve and communicate their commitment to responsible fisheries. However, achieving a ‘compliant’ status with the FiTI should not be taken at face value to mean a country is necessarily more transparent than others. More importantly, nor does it mean that the country is necessarily managing its fisheries in a responsible way. The FiTI does not provide this analysis. 

The status of a country in the FiTI should therefore not be used to justify trade and investment decisions. Some of the countries involved in the initiative may hope that it does. This would be a source of concern, including for those countries that may have legitimate reasons to not engage with the initiative.

Going forward with the FiTI

The FiTI provides a practical way of improving the availability and reliability of information on fisheries. The FiTi therefore fills an important gap in international fisheries reform efforts, as no other initiative exists that tackles the issue of transparency in a concerted way. 

There are opportunities to use the data stemming from the FiTI to advance fisheries reforms efforts, and where appropriate to put pressure for increased accountability of national authorities and the private sector. A lot depends on how citizens and stakeholders respond to increased information provided as a result of the FiTI, and the extent to which participating countries embrace the ideal of “progressive improvements” and multi-stakeholder participation. The success of the FiTI in many contexts will therefore be influenced by resources and capacities of civil society organisations, fishing organisations and journalists to promote and engage in public debates and decision making processes. Ultimately the impact of the FiTi will be dependent on the willingness of those in positions of authority to listen and act on the recommendations from civil society and the fisheries sector. However, a threat to the credibility of the FiTI lies in the prospect of it being implemented in countries where governments continue to limit individual and media freedoms and genuine participation in decision making. The FiTI must not be allowed to provide such governments with a status of legitimacy.